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INSURANCE LAW
Terrence L. Graves*
J. Douglas Cuthbertson**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews the changes in Virginia insurance law that
have occurred in the past two years. Most of the developments
have been in motor vehicle liability and uninsured/underinsured
motorist ("VM/UIM") coverage.' But the article also surveys cases
on bad faith, fire insurance, insurance regulation, life insurance,
motor vehicle medical expense insurance, and waiver and estop-
pel.
II. BAD FAITH
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. St. John,2 the Supreme
Court of Virginia considered whether Nationwide acted in good
faith under Virginia Code section 8.01-66.1(A).' Joel St. John,
* Principal, Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. BA, cum
laude, 1986, Howard University;, J.D., 1991, University of Virginia School of Law.
** Associate, Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1993,
University of Richmond; J.D., 1997, University of Houston Law Center.
1. Only those statutory changes likely to impact insurance practitioners will be dis-
cussed.
2. 259 Va. 71, 524 S.E.2d 649(2000).
3. Virginia Code section 8.01-66.1(A) states:
Whenever any insurance company licensed in this Commonwealth to write
insurance as defined in § 38.2-124 denies, refuses or fails to pay to its insured
a claim of $2,500 or less in excess of the deductible, if any, under the provi-
sions of a policy of motor vehicle insurance issued by such company to the in-
sured and it is subsequently found by the judge of a court of proper jurisdic-
tion that such denial, refusal or failure to pay was not made in good faith, the
company shall be liable to the insured in an amount double the amount oth-
erwise due and payable under the provisions of the insured's policy of motor
vehicle insurance, together with reasonable attorney's fees and expenses.
The provisions of this subsection shall be construed to include an insurance
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who was an insured under his father's automobile policy with Na-
tionwide, was injured in a car accident.4 After the company re-
fused to pay all of his chiropractor's bills, he sued and recovered
the disallowed costs.' Pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-
66.1(A), the trial court doubled his damages and awarded him at-
torney's fees.6
The supreme court had not construed this statute, but it had
interpreted Virginia Code section 38.2-209.' Following the same
analysis, the court held that Virginia Code section 8.01-66.1(A) is
both remedial and punitive, and that an insurer's conduct is
evaluated under a standard of reasonableness.' An insured must
prove that the insurer acted unreasonably by a preponderance of
the evidence.9
Applying these principles, the court found that Nationwide
acted unreasonably in denying St. John's claim.'" Nationwide had
no medical evidence that St. John's injuries were not caused by
the accident and no medical opinion that the treatment did not
relate to his injuries and was not medically necessary and rea-
sonable.11 Thus, the trial court's judgment that Nationwide acted
in bad faith was not clearly erroneous. 2
Justice Compton concurred in the opinion, but would have ap-
plied a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof.'3
This holding illustrates that an insurer has the burden of pro-
ducing positive evidence to support its determination that an in-
company's refusal or failure to pay medical expenses to persons covered un-
der the terms of any medical payments coverage extended under a policy of
motor vehicle insurance, when the amount of the claim therefor is $2,500 or
less and the refusal was not made in good faith.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-66.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
4. Nationwide, 259 Va. at 73-74, 524 S.E.2d at 650.
5. Id. at 74, 524 S.E.2d at 650.
6. Id. at 74-75, 524 S.E.2d at 650.
7. Id. at 75, 524 S.E.2d at 650-51 (stating that section 38.2-209 "allows an insured to
recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees in a declaratory judgment action brought by
the insured against the insurer, if the trial court determines that the insurer was not act-
ing in good faith when it denied coverage or refused payment under the policy").
8. Id. (citing CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Norman, 237 Va. 33, 38, 375 S.E.2d 724, 726-
27 (1989)).
9. Id. at 76, 524 S.E.2d at 651.
10. See id. at 78, 524 S.E.2d at 652.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 80, 524 S.E.2d at 653-54 (Compton, J., concurring).
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sured's medical treatment was unnecessary, unreasonable, or not
causally related to his injuries.
III. FIRE INSURANCE
The Supreme Court of Virginia has decided only one fire insur-
ance case since June 1998. In Hitt Contracting, Inc. v. Industrial
Risk Insurers,'4 the supreme court held that a suit for failure to
pay a claim under a replacement coverage endorsement" is sub-
ject to the two-year limitations period in the policy and Virginia
Code section 38.2-2105.16
Hitt Contracting built a new fuel farm at Washington National
Airport and later had to fix the piping system after it started
leaking. 7 The Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority re-
fused to pay for the repairs, as did its insurer more than two
years after they were made." The contractor sued the insurance
company, but the Alexandria Circuit Court dismissed the case on
the insurer's demurrer and special plea of the statute of limita-
tions. 9
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the limitations pe-
riod in Virginia Code section 38.2-2105 barred the claim even
though the policy provided broader coverage than a standard fire
insurance policy.2" The supreme court stated that Virginia Code
sections 38.2-2100, -2101, and -2119 encompass "'policies of fire
insurance in combination with other insurance coverages" and
allow replacement cost endorsements.2' Even so, this endorse-
14. 258 Va. 40, 516 S.E.2d 216 (1999).
15. The endorsement stated that "the coverage under this policy... is hereby ex-
tended to cover such property to the amount actually expended by or in behalf of the In-
sured to repair, rebuild or replace within two (2) years from the date of loss or damage."
Id. at 44, 516 S.E.2d at 217.
16. Id. at 47, 516 S.E.2d at 219. Virginia Code section 38.2-2105 provides that a suit
to recover a claim under a fire insurance policy must be "commenced within two years
next after inception of the loss." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2105 (Repl. Vol. 1999). Section
38.2-2105 was made part of the policy by a "Virginia Amendatory Endorsement." Hitt Con-
tracting, 258 Va. at 43-44, 516 S.E.2d at 217.
17. Hitt Contracting, 258 Va. at 42-43, 516 S.E.2d at 216.
18. Id. at 43, 516 S.E.2d at 216.
19. Id., 516 S.E.2d at 216-17.
20. Id. at 44, 516 S.E.2d at 217.
21. Id. at 44-45, 516 S.E.2d at 217 (emphasis added) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-
2100, -2101, -2119 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
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ment did not provide separate coverage.22 It just described the
manner by which the amount of recovery is measured.23
Virginia Code section 38.2-2119(B) does not establish a differ-
ent procedure for recovery under the endorsement.' Rather, it
protects a claim for replacement cost value after an insured has
made a timely claim for the actual cash value of the loss."
The contractor argued that since the endorsement covers costs
incurred up to two years after the loss, "applying the two-year
limitations period could require an insured to file suit 'before
those costs can be presented to the insurers, or before the insured
and insurer even fail to agree to the amount of the recovery."26
Nonetheless, the court held that this possibility "does not change
the plain language of section 38.2-2105 and of [the] policy."27
IV. INSURANCE REGULATION
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia considered the authority of the State Corporation Com-mission ("SCC") in Gross v. Weingarten.2' The case arose "from
the financial collapse and subsequent receivership of Fidelity
Bankers Life Insurance ("FBL")."29 The receivership order ad-
judged FBL insolvent, enjoined all persons from interfering with
the SCC's rehabilitation and liquidation proceedings, and ap-
pointed the Insurance Commissioner as the Deputy Receiver. °
22. Id. at 45, 516 S.E.2d at 218.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 45-46, 516 S.E.2d at 218. Section 38.2-2119(B) provides:
Where any policy of insurance issued or delivered in this Commonwealth
pursuant to this chapter provides for the payment of the full replacement cost
of property insured thereunder, the policy shall permit the insured to assert a
claim for the actual cash value of the property without prejudice to his right
to thereafter assert a claim for the difference between the actual cash value
and the full replacement cost unless a claim for full replacement cost has
been previously resolved. Any claim for such difference must be made within
six months of(i) the last date on which the insured received a payment for ac-
tual cash value or (ii) date of entry of a final order of a court of competent ju-
risdiction declaratory of the right of the insured to full replacement cost,
whichever shall last occur.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2119(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
25. Hitt Contracting, 258 Va. at 46, 516 S.E.2d at 218.
26. Id. at 46, 516 S.E.2d at 219.
27. Id. at 47, 516 S.E.2d at 219.
28. 18 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Va. 1998).
29. Id. at 617.
30. Id.
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The commissioner initiated an action on behalf of FBL, its poli-
cyholders, and its creditors to recover losses from alleged viola-
tions of federal securities law, state statutory law, and common
law.3 Despite having been adjudged insolvent, FBL was found
during the litigation to have substantial assets, so the court gave
the defendants leave to file counterclaims.32 The district court
later granted the receiver's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings2
The district court found that the SCC's receivership order,
which established an exclusive forum for the resolution of claims
against FBL, was "entitled to full faith and credit and divest[ed]
[the] court of subject matter jurisdiction."34 The federal govern-
ment has left the regulation of insurance to the states, and Vir-
ginia Code section 38.2-1508 establishes a single regulatory
scheme for resolving claims against insolvent insurers.3 ' The
court found that the SCC's receivership order established "exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the fullest extent of [its] statutory authority."36
The court also rejected the argument that the Deputy Receiver
had waived the SCC's exclusive jurisdiction by filing his claims in
federal court." The court noted that "to 'hold that a receiver, by
going into a foreign court to collect sums alleged to be due the es-
tate, thereby opens the estate to suits in those foreign jurisdic-
tions would defeat the goal of state insurance insolvency stat-
utes .... ,38
3L Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 620.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 618. Virginia Code section 38.2-1508 states that when the SCC "is author-
ized to act as a receiver to rehabilitate or liquidate an insurer... [all further proceedings
in connection with the rehabilitation or liquidation shall be conducted by the Commis-
sion...." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1508 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
36. Gross, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
37. Id. at 619.
38. Id. (quoting Bard v. Charles Myers Ins. Agency, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex.
1992)).
2000]
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V. LIFE INSURANCE
A. Application
Three cases involving life insurance have been decided in the
past two years. In the first, Hilfiger v. Transamerica Occidental
Life Insurance Co.,39 the Supreme Court of Virginia answered
three questions about the enforceability of a life insurance policy
certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.4 °
James A. Hilfiger applied to Transamerica for an insurance
policy on the life of his father, naming himself as the benefici-
ary.4 Claiming that he had his father's permission to do so, Hilfi-
ger answered all of the questions and signed his father's name on
the application, which was witnessed by a Transamerica agent.42
His father later underwent a medical examination, during which
he signed part of the application.43 Transamerica subsequently is-
sued the policy, and Hilfiger's father died approximately two
months later.' Hilfiger sued the company after it refused to pay
the proceeds of the policy.45
The Fourth Circuit certified three questions to the supreme
court.46 First, it asked whether the application violated Virginia
Code section 38.2-302.4" The supreme court held that it did, as the
facts did not show that either statutory condition was met.' Nei-
ther the father's oral authorization nor his "material participa-
tion" in the application process, in other words, being examined
constituted "applying" for the policy.49 Furthermore, his signature
39. 256 Va. 265, 505 S.E.2d 190 (1998).
40. Id. at 267, 505 S.E.2d at 191.
41. Id. at 268, 505 S.E.2d at 191.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 268, 505 S.E.2d at 191-92.
45. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 192.
46. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 191.
47. Id. at 269, 505 S.E.2d at 192. Virginia Code section 38.2-302(A) states: "No con-
tract of insurance upon a person shall be made or effectuated unless at the time of the
making of the contract the individual insured, being of lawful age and competent to con-
tract for the insurance contract (i) applies for insurance, or (ii) consents in writing to the
insurance contract." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-302(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
48. Hilfiger, 256 Va. at 269-70, 505 S.E.2d at 192.
49. Id. at 270, 505 S.E.2d at 192-93.
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on the medical form, which contained none of the contract terms,
did not qualify as "written consent 'to the insurance contract."'5 °
The court answered the second question-whether the policy
should be enforced pursuant to section 38.2-319 51-in the nega-
tive.52 The supreme court concluded that doing otherwise would
render section 38.2-302 meaningless.13 Virginia Code section 38.2-
319 applies to insurance contracts that are "made" illegally, but
no contract even can be "made or effectuated" if the requirements
of section 38.2-302 are not met.54 In the latter case, any policy is-
sued is void ab initio.5"
The third question was "whether an insurance company can be
estopped [from] rely[ing] on section 38.2-302 because its agent
knew [that the signature on the application was incorrect]."56 The
supreme court answered this question in the negative.5 7 The court
refused to apply equitable estoppel because "[t]hat statute was
not enacted for the protection of the beneficiary but to protect the
insured against potentially improper motives of the beneficiary.""
Public policy concerns almost compel a decision such as Hilfi-
ger. Otherwise, people with less than honorable intentions would
be encouraged to buy life insurance policies on family members
and others and to name themselves as beneficiaries in the hopes
of profiting from the proceeds. The supreme court recognized this
in Hilfiger, noting that "[a]t common law, a policy of insurance
taken out on the life of an insured without the insured's knowl-
edge or consent... was usually held void as against public pol-
icy."59 The reason for this rule was the risk that a beneficiary
might "be tempted to 'hasten by improper means the time when
he will receive the benefits of the policy."'
50. Id. at 270, 505 S.E.2d at 193 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-302(A)(ii) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
51. Virginia Code section 38.2-319 provides that "[a]ny insurance contract made in
violation of the laws of this Commonwealth may be enforced against the insurer." VA.
CODE ANN. § 38.2-319 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
52. See Hilfiger, 256 Va. at 271, 505 S.E.2d at 193.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-319 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 273, 505 S.E.2d at 194.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 269, 505 S.E.2d at 192.
60. Id. (quoting Wood v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 336 S.E.2d 806, 809 (1985)).
2000]
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B. Cancellation
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia also decided a case involving the payment of life insur-
ance policy proceeds. In Herndon v. Massachusetts General Life
Insurance Co.,61 the executrix of the insured's estate, along with a
lender that was an assignee of the policy proceeds, sued to re-
cover the proceeds despite the alleged lapse of the policy for non-
payment of premiums.62 Both parties filed summary judgment
motions.63
While no Virginia court had addressed the issue, many juris-
dictions had held that "nonpayment of premiums is an affirma-
tive defense for which the insurer bears the burden of proof," and
the district court adopted this rule.' It was undisputed that the
insured failed to pay the premiums, but a question of fact existed
as to whether the insurer sent notice to the lender that the policy
was about to lapse, which precluded summary judgment.65 The
district court also held that the insurer bears the burden of
proving that proper notice was sent to the insured before termi-
nation of coverage, where the policy so requires.6
C. Change of Beneficiary
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson6 7 was another
case in which a federal court anticipated the likely holding of the
Supreme Court of Virginia. Lincoln National filed interpleader
and declaratory relief actions in the United States District Court
61. 28 F. Supp. 2d 379 (W.D. Va. 1998).
62. Id. at 381.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 381 n.3. For treatment of the issue by other jurisdictions, see, for example,
Huff v. Standard Life Insurance Co., 638 F.2d 1363, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982); Wiles v. Na-
tionwide Insurance Co., 334 F.2d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 1964); Sethman Electric & Manufac-
turing Co. v. Mountain States Life Insurance Co., 23 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Col. 1933); N.Y. Life
Insurance Co. v. Holroyd, 68 P.2d 529, 520-30 (Okla. 1937); Shock v. Pennsylvania Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 24 A.2d 738, 740 (Pa. Super. 1942).
65. Herndon, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 382-85.
66. See id. at 381 n.3 (citing Villwock v. Ins. Co. of N. AmJCIGNA, 22 Va. App. 127,
134, 468 S.E.2d 130, 134 (Ct. App. 1996) (stating that the insurer bears the burden of
proof on the issue of notice); Wright v. Grain Dealers Nat'l Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 186 F.2d
956, 958 (4th Cir. 1950) (holding that the insurer must comply with policy terms govern-
ing cancellation)).
67. 38 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D. Va. 1999).
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for the Eastern District of Virginia to resolve conflicting claims to
the proceeds of a life insurance policy.6" The claims were made by
the children from the insured's first marriage, his second wife,
and the daughter of his second wife, whom he had adopted.69 The
children from the first marriage moved to dismiss the inter-
pleader claims of the others."
A stipulation and agreement between the insured and his first
wife provided:
[I-1]usband shall maintain in full force and effect all insurance on his
life, and the beneficiary of such insurances shall be the Wife until
such time as a final divorce decree shall be entered by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Thereafter the beneficiaries of such insur-
ance shall be the children of the parties.
7 1
This stipulation and agreement was incorporated into their final
divorce decree.72
The district court noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia
had not ruled on the effect of a stipulation and agreement incor-
porated into a divorce decree on an insured's property right to
change the beneficiary designation of his life insurance policy.
7 3
Several other jurisdictions, however, had held that a separation
agreement restricting the right to change a beneficiary, or re-
quiring that a certain beneficiary be named, "takes precedence
over future attempts by the insured to change the beneficiary."'
Based on these cases, the district court anticipated that the Su-
preme Court of Virginia would hold that a contractual obligation,
such as the stipulation and agreement, takes precedence over the
existing beneficiary designation and any expectancy interest of
the second wife and adopted daughter. 5 Therefore, the district
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id. at 442-43.
70. Id. at 444.
7L Id. at 447.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 449-50.
74. Id. at 450-51 (citing Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Jones, 629 F.2d 356, 359
(4th Cir. 1982); Glover v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 664 F.2d 1101, 1103 (8th Cir. 1981); Murphy
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 534 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976); Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Karney,
5 F. Supp. 2d 720, 731 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Perkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 455 F. Supp. 499,
501 (D. W. Va. 1978); Western Life Ins. Co. v. Bower, 153 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (D. Mo. 1957);
Dubois v. Smith, 599 A.2d 493, 497 (N.H. 1991); Herrington v. Boatright, 633 S.W.2d 781,
783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)).
75. Id. at 451.
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court upheld the insured's previous contractual obligation,
granted the motion to dismiss, and ordered that the policy pro-
ceeds be disbursed to the children from the insured's first mar-
riage. 7
6
VI. MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE
A. Loading and Unloading
In Wagoner v. Benson, 7 the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the issue of sovereign immunity in an action against a school
board and a school bus driver. In that case, Amanda Wagoner
was hit by a car while crossing a street to board her school bus. 9
The Henry County Circuit Court found that the school board's
motor vehicle liability policy "did not provide valid, collectible in-
surance for Wagoner's injuries." ° Therefore, the circuit court
dismissed her motion for judgment, holding that the defendants
were entitled to sovereign immunity under Virginia Code section
22.1-194.8'
The supreme court reversed, concluding that the accident arose
out of the "loading" of the bus and was covered by the school
board's policy. 2 The policy did not define "loading," but from the
driver's perspective, it involved a number of steps, including
turning on flashing lights, extending the mechanical stop sign
and the metal safety gate, and keeping these devices on until the
students were on the bus. 3 Since all of these things were hap-
pening when Wagoner was hit, the supreme court held that the
accident arose during the "loading" of the bus.'
76. Id. at 452.
77. 256 Va. 260, 505 S.E.2d 188 (1998).
78. Id. at 262, 505 S.E.2d at 188.
79. Id.
80. Id., 505 S.E.2d at 189.
81. Id. Virginia Code section 22.1-194 says that if a school board is an insured under a
policy covering a vehicle involved in an accident, it is "subject to action up to, but not be-
yond, the limits of valid and collectible insurance in force to cover the injury complained
of... and the defense of governmental immunity shall not be a bar to action or recovery."
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
82. Wagoner, 256 Va. at 262, 505 S.E.2d at 188.
83. Id. at 263, 505 S.E.2d at 189.
84. Id.
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In Wagoner, the supreme court also stated that Stern v. Cin-
cinnati Insurance Co., 5 a case in which students were injured
while approaching their school bus, was distinguishableY The is-
sue in Stern was whether an injured student was an insured un-
der a school board's UM coverage or was entitled to coverage un-
der the UM statute.8 7 Thus according to the court in Wagoner,
Stern focused on the student's-not the driver's-use of the in-
sured vehicle.' Furthermore, the supreme court stated that Stern
interpreted the words "using" and "occupying" in the context of
UM coverage, not the meaning of the word "loading" in the con-
text of an automobile liability policy. 9
B. Misrepresentation
Smith v. Colonial Insurance Co.,9 ° the only other automobile li-
ability insurance case decided by the Supreme Court of Virginia,
involved misrepresentations by the insured during the applica-
tion process.9 In this case, Smith told an agent of Colonial that
she owned a 1979 Chevrolet pickup truck and that no other li-
censed drivers lived with her.92 Colonial issued a policy based on
her oral and written statements, but it would have cancelled the
policy or charged a higher premium had it known the statements
were false.93 While the policy was in effect, Smith's daughter was
injured in a car accident and made a claim for UM coverage un-
der her mother's policy.94
Colonial sought a judgment declaring that the policy was void
ab initio and that coverage was not owed to Smith's daughter.95
After an evidentiary hearing, the Augusta County Circuit Court
ruled that Colonial had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that Smith made material misrepresentations when applying for
85. 252 Va. 307, 477 S.E.2d 517 (1996).
86. Wagoner, 256 Va. at 263-64, 505 S.E.2d at 189.
87. Stern, 252 Va. at 310, 477 S.E.2d at 519.
88. Wagoner, 256 Va. at 264, 505 S.E.2d at 189.
89. Id. at 264, 505 S.E.2d at 189-90.
90. 258 Va. 30, 515 S.E.2d 775 (1999).
91. Id. at 31, 515 S.E.2d at 776.
92. Id. at 32, 515 S.E.2d at 776.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 31, 515 S.E.2d at 776.
95. Id. at 32, 515 S.E.2d at 776.
2000]
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the policy, and granted the declaratory judgment."
The issue on appeal was whether the circuit court correctly de-
cided that the parol evidence rule did not apply to testimony
about questions by Colonial's agent and Smith's verbal answers
during the application process.97 The Smiths argued that all mis-
leading statements that Smith made before signing the applica-
tion were "merged" into the contract of insurance, the terms of
which could not be varied by parol evidence.9"
The supreme court said that this argument "demonstrates a
misconception of insurance law and practice generally and the
application process for motor vehicle liability insurance in par-
ticular."99 An insurance application, which can be oral or written,
is merely an offer to enter into a contract-the policy is the con-
tract between the parties.1°' Since the parol evidence rule only
applies to written contracts, it is irrelevant to the insurance ap-
plication.'' Thus, the circuit court properly considered the writ-
ten application form, as well as the oral testimony explaining its
completion, as evidence that material misrepresentations had
been made. 0 2
C. Omnibus Clause
The 1999 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
38.2-2204, the "omnibus clause" statute, allowing insurers to
limit their liability under such a clause. 10 3 That section requires
that every motor vehicle liability policy contain an omnibus
clause insuring the named insured "and any other person using
or responsible for the use of the motor vehicle with the expressed
96. Id. The circuit court found that Colonial met the requirements of Virginia Code
section 38.2-309. Id. Virginia Code section 38.2-309 mandates that statements in an appli-
cation for an insurance policy shall bar recovery under the policy if it is "clearly proved"
that they were "material to the risk when assumed" and were "untrue." VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-309 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
97. Colonial Ins., 258 Va. at 31, 515 S.E.2d at 776.
98. Id. at 33, 515 S.E.2d at 777.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 33-34, 515 S.E.2d at 777.
102. Id. at 34, 515 S.E.2d at 777.
103. S.B. 448, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 9, 1999, ch.
4, 1999 Va. Acts 4) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(A), (C) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
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or implied consent of the named insured."14
Senate Bill 448 added a provision that states that the statute
does not prohibit insurers from limiting their responsibility for
any one accident to the liability limits set forth in the policy, re-
gardless of the number of insureds covered by the policy.' °5
VII. MOTOR VEHICLE MEDICAL EXPENSE INSURANCE
In the past two years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has de-
cided two cases involving exclusions to motor vehicle medical ex-
pense coverage. The first, Scarbrow v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co.,' involved an exclusion for medical
expenses that were payable under the workers' compensation
statute.0 7 The plaintiff argued that the exclusion was inconsis-
tent with Virginia Code section 38.2-2201 and, therefore, was
"void as against public policy."'
In Scarbrow, the Supreme Court of Virginia adhered to its de-
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(C) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
105. Va. S.B. 448. The bill amended subsections (A) and (C) adding the following lan-
guage to each:
[I-owever, nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prohibit an
insurer from limiting its liability under any one policy for bodily injury or
property damage resulting from any one accident or occurrence to the liabil-
ity limits for such coverage set forth in the policy for any such accident or oc-
currence regardless of the number of insureds under that policy.
Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2204(A), (C) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
106. 256 Va. 357, 504 S.E.2d 860 (1998).
107. The exclusion read: 'This insurance does not apply... to bodily injury sustained
by any person to the extent that benefits therefore are in whole or in part payable under
any workmen's compensation law, employer's disability benefits law or any other similar
law." Id. at 359, 504 S.E.2d at 860-61.
108. Id. at 360, 504 S.E.2d at 861. Virginia Code section 38.2-2201 provides, in perti-
nent part, that:
A. Upon request of an insured, each insurer licensed in this Commonwealth
issuing or delivering any policy or contract of bodily injury or property dam-
age liability insurance covering liability arising from the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of any motor vehicle shall provide on payment of the premium,
as a minimum coverage.., to the named insured... the following health
care and disability benefits for each accident:
1. All reasonable and necessary expenses for medical, chiropractic,
hospital, dental, surgical, ambulance, prosthetic and rehabilitation
services, and funeral expenses, resulting from the accident and in-
curred within three years after the date of the accident, up to $2,000
per person....
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
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cision in Baker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., °9 which involved the same issue and coverage exclusion. Re-
peating the language used in Baker, the supreme court held that
the exclusion was a "clear and unambiguous provision [that] rea-
sonably excludes medical payments coverage where those benefits
are payable under a workers' compensation statute, and that no
conflict or inconsistency existed between [Virginia Code section]
38.2-2201 and the policy exclusion.""' The supreme court refused
to reverse its prior decision and find the exclusion void."'
The second case involving an exclusion to medical expense cov-
erage is Pauley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co."'
In that case, the insured sued State Farm to recover medical
payments under his and his wife's policies, both issued by State
Farm."3 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that he was not en-
titled to benefits under his wife's policy, since his car was not an
insured vehicle under her policy." 4
The court followed its holding in Cotchan v. State Farm Fire
and Casualty Co."5 and stated that Virginia Code section 38.2-
2201 "does not prohibit reasonable exclusions of medical expense
coverage that are clear and unambiguous.""6 In Cotchan, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that an exclusion did not violate the
statute's provisions requiring that coverage be extended to rela-
tives of a named insured and permitting the "stacking" of cover-
age for up to four insured vehicles." 7 In Pauley, the wife's policy
109. 242 Va. 74, 405 S.E.2d 624(1991).
110. Scarbrow, 250 Va. at 360, 504 S.E.2d at 861 (quoting Baker, 242 Va. at 76, 405
S.E.2d at 625).
111. Id. at 361, 504 S.E.2d at 862.
112. 260 Va. 1, 530 S.E.2d 414 (2000).
113. Opening Brief for Appellant at 1, Pauley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260
Va. 1, 530 S.E.2d 414 (2000) (No. 992366).
114. Pauley, 260 Va. at 2, 530 S.E.2d at 415.
115. 250 Va. 232, 462 S.E.2d 78 (1995).
116. Pauley, 260 Va. at 2, 530 S.E.2d at 415 (quoting Cotchan, 250 Va. at 234-35, 462
S.E.2d at 80).
117. Cotchan, 250 Va. at 234-35, 462 S.E.2d at 80. Virginia Code section 38.2-2201 pro-
vides in pertinent part:
A. Upon request of an insured, each insurer licensed in this Commonwealth
issuing or delivering any policy or contract of bodily injury or property dam-
age liability insurance covering liability arising from the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of any motor vehicle shall provide on payment of the premium,
as a minimum coverage.., to the named insured and, while resident of the
named insured's household, the spouse and relatives of the named insured
while in or upon, entering or alighting from or through being struck by a mo-
INSURANCE LAW
defined an "insured vehicle" as one insured under the same policy
as the vehicle for which medical expense coverage is being sought,
not just one insured under a State Farm policy." 8 Thus, the court
found that the exclusion was clear and unambiguous and did not
violate the statute."9
VIII. MOTOR VEHICLE UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST COVERAGE
A. Definition of Insured
In Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Gile,2 ° the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether an insured's co-
habitant's child is his "foster child," making her an "insured" un-
der his automobile policy.' 2' In this case, Charmayne Gile was
injured in a car accident with Norman Russell Carter, Jr.122 At
the time, she lived with her mother and her mother's companion,
Danny J. Beavers, Jr., the named insured under a Farm Bureau
policy. 123
Gile, by her next friend, sued Carter for personal injuries,
serving a copy of the motion for judgment on Farm Bureau pur-
suant to Virginia Code section 38.2-2206." Farm Bureau filed an
tor vehicle while not occupying a motor vehicle, [certain health care and dis-
ability benefits].
C. In any policy of personal automobile insurance in which the insured has
purchased coverage under subsection A of this section, every insurer provid-
ing such coverage arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of no more
than four motor vehicles shall be liable to pay up to the maximum policy limit
available on every motor vehicle insured under that coverage if the health
care or disability expenses and costs mentioned in subsection A of this section
exceed the limits of coverage for any one motor vehicle so insured.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2201(A), (C) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
118. Pauley, 260 Va. at 2, 530 S.E.2d at 415.
119. Id.
120. 259 Va. 164, 524 S.E.2d 642 (2000).
121. Id. at 166, 524 S.E.2d at 642-43.
122. Id., 524 S.E.2d at 643.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 167, 524 S.E.2d at 643. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(F) states:
If any action is instituted against the owner or operator of an uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicle by any insured intending to rely on the unin-
sured or underinsured coverage provision or endorsement of this policy under
which the insured is making a claim, then the insured shall serve a copy of
20001
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action seeking a declaration that Gile was not an insured under
the UMIUIM and medical expense benefits provisions of Bea-
vers's policy.'25 The trial court found that Gile was Beavers's "fos-
ter child" and, as such, was an insured under the policy.126
The supreme court reversed, holding that Gile was not Bea-
vers's "foster child" under the terms of the policy.127 The court
noted that because the policy language was taken directly from
Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B), 2 the parties were bound by
the plain meaning of the words in the statute.129 The term "foster
child" is not defined in Title 38.2, so the court looked to other
statutes. 3 ° By implication, the court found that a "foster child" is
a child who receives "foster care services."'3' Since Gile was not a
recipient of such services, she was not covered under Beavers's
policy as his "foster child." 3 2
B. Purpose
In Superior Insurance Co. v. Hunter,3 the Supreme Court of
Virginia decided that a vehicle cannot be "underinsured" with re-
the process upon this insurer in the manner prescribed by law, as though the
insurer were a party defendant ... The insurer shall then have the right to
file pleadings and take other action allowable by law in the name of the
owner or operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or in its
own name.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(F) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
125. Gile, 259 Va. at 167, 524 S.E.2d at 643. The UMUIM provisions defined
"PERSONS INSURED" as "the named insured and while residents of the same house-
hold... foster children." Id. at 166-67, 524 S.E.2d at 643. The medical expense benefits
provisions covered the named insured and any "relative," which included foster children.
Id. at 167, 524 S.E.2d at 643. The policy did not define the term "foster children." Id at
166-67, 524 S.E.2d at 643.
126. Id. at 167, 524 S.E.2d at 643.
127. Id. at 170, 524 S.E.2d at 645.
128. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B) states, "'[ilnsured' ... means the named in-
sured and, while resident of the same household.., foster children." VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
129. Gile, 259 Va. at 168, 524 S.E.2d at 644.
130. Id. Virginia Code section 16.1-228 defines "[f]oster care services' as the provision
of a full range of casework, treatment and community services for a planned period of time
to a child who is abused or neglected as defined in § 63.1-248.2 or in need of services." VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
131. Gile, 259 Va. at 169, 524 S.E.2d at 644.
132. Id.
133. 258 Va. 338, 520 S.E.2d 646 (1999).
INSURANCE LAW
spect to itself."4 In that case, the passengers of a car driven by
the tortfeasor-alU of whom were named insureds under an auto-
mobile insurance policy issued by Superior-were injured in a car
accident.'35 Superior paid the claims of victims in the other car,
which totaled $38,500, so only $11,500 of the $50,000 in total li-
ability coverage for the accident was left to satisfy the insureds'
claims. 6 Consequently, the insureds brought declaratory judg-
ment actions to recover UIM benefits under the policy.'37
The Hampton Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of the
passengers. 38 It held that the vehicle was underinsured to the ex-
tent that the $11,500 in remaining liability coverage was less
than $25,000, the amount of UM coverage for each person injured
in the accident.
3 9
The supreme court, however, held that Virginia Code section
38.2-2206(B) "contemplates a situation in which... at least two
applicable insurance policies at issue-the liability coverage pro-
vided by a tortfeasor's insurance policy and the [UM/UIM] cover-
age of the injured party's insurance policy."'4 ° While Virginia
Code section 38.2-2206(A) does not allow the amount of liability
coverage to be less than the UM/UIM coverage provided by the
policy,' "the definition of 'uninsured' in subsection (B) contem-
plates just such a scenario .... 142 The supreme court stated that
this construction was the only way that the two sections can be
reconciled.'
134. Id. at 344, 520 S.E.2d at 649.
135. Id. at 340, 520 S.E.2d at 647.
136. Id. at 340-41, 520 S.E.2d at 647.
137. Id. at 341, 520 S.E.2d at 647.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 344, 520 S.E.2d at 649. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(B) states:
A motor vehicle is "underinsured" when, and to the extent that, the total
amount of bodily injury and property damage coverage applicable to the op-
eration or use of the motor vehicle and available for payment for such bodily
injury or property damage.., is less than the total amount of uninsured mo-
torist coverage afforded any person injured as a result of the operation or use
of the vehicle.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
141. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206(A) requires that the limits of the UA]U.IM cover-
age of any policy issued in Virginia to "equal but not exceed the limits of the liability in-
surance provided by the policy." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(A) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
142. Superior Ins., 258 Va. at 344, 520 S.E.2d at 649.
143. Id.
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Thus, the supreme court held that the statute does not allow a
claimant "to recover under both the liability and [UJMUIV] cov-
erages of a single policy."1" Since the UTM/UIM coverage is not
"afforded" to the insureds, no coverage exists with which "to com-
pare the amount of liability coverage 'available for payment'" to
determine whether the vehicle is underinsured. 145
The supreme court noted that the construction of Virginia Code
section 38.2-2206 urged by the insureds would be an "arbitrary
expansion of [their] recovery options." 46 The insureds could have
contracted for more liability coverage, but "they cannot... aug-
ment their liability coverage by accessing the underinsured mo-
torist coverage of their own policy."147
C. Stacking
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Virginia considered the issue of "stacking" of UM coverage in
Keene v. Travelers Indemnity Co.'" There, the parents of a child
who was killed in a car accident involving an uninsured motorist
filed a declaratory judgment action against their UM carrier
seeking a determination of the amount of coverage available. 49
The policy had a bodily injury liability limit of UM coverage of
"$100,000 Each Person/$300,000 Each Accident." 5 ° The parents
argued "that the coverage limits were tripled because... three
separate vehicles were insured under the policy, for which sepa-
rate premiums were paid."'5'
144. Id. at 345, 520 S.E.2d at 649.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 345, 520 S.E.2d at 650 (quoting Trisvan v. Agway Ins. Co., 254 Va. 416, 419,
492 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1997)).
147. Id.
148. 73 F. Supp. 2d 638 (W.D. Va. 1999).
149. Id. at 639.
150. Id.
15L Id. The policy read:
Regardless of the number of... motor vehicles to which this insurance ap-
plies, the limit for Part HI-Protection Against Uninsured Motorists is as
follows:
(a) If the schedule or declarations indicates split limits of liability, the
limit of liability for bodily injury stated as applicable to "each person"
is the limit of The Company's liability for all damages because of bodily
injury sustained by one person as the result of any one accident and,
INSURANCE LAW
On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-
trict court found that the policy limits may not be stacked on the
basis that multiple vehicles were insured under the policy.15 2 The
district court relied on Goodville Mutual Casualty Co. v. Borror,153
in which the Supreme Court of Virginia held that almost identical
language was "clear and unambiguous and requires the construc-
tion that stacking is not permissible."'54
The district court also predicted that, under Virginia law, the
parents' claim for their child's medical expenses would fall within
the bodily injury limit of $100,000 per person, rather than the
limit of $300,000 per occurrence. 55 Most other state courts had
held that bodily injury limits include derivative claims.'56 In this
case, however, the district court held that "the usual and ordinary
construction of the language in the policy is that the limit applies
to all claims for damages resulting from bodily injury sustained
by one person, regardless of who asserts the claims."'57
D. Statutory Changes
In 1999, the General Assembly amended the UM/UIM statute
to include a tolling provision for "John Doe" actions.5 8 The stat-
ute already provided that an injured driver who brings such an
action is not barred from later suing the actual driver if his iden-
tity becomes known.' 9 House Bill 1901 amended the statute to
provide that the act of bringing a "John Doe" action tolls the stat-
ute of limitations for up to three years, for the purpose of bringing
subject to the above provision respecting "each person" the limit of li-
ability for bodily injury stated as applicable to "each accident", is the
total limit of The Company's liability for all damages because of bodily
injury sustained by two or more persons as the result of any one acci-
dent....
Id. at 640.
152. Id. at 638.
153. 221 Va. 967, 275 S.E.2d 625 (1981).
154. Id. at 971, 275 S.E.2d at 628.
155. Keene, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 638.
156. Id. at 641 (citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. H.B. 1901, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch.
992, 1999 Va. Acts 2627) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(G) (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2206(G) (Repl. Vol. 1994).
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an action against the actual driver when he is identified. 6 '
E. Use of Vehicle
In Newman v. Erie Insurance Exchange,'16' another school bus
case,'62 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a child
was "using" the bus at the time of the accident within the mean-
ing of Virginia Code section 38.2-2206 and, therefore, was entitled
to UMIUIM benefits under the school board's insurance policy. 6 '
Seven-year-old Johnny Newman was hit by a car while crossing
the street to board the bus, which was stopped with its warning
lights and "stop arm" activated." Erie, which insured the bus
under a commercial automobile liability policy issued to the
school board, sought a declaratory judgment that Newman was
not occupying or using the school bus and was not entitled to
UM/UIM benefits.'65 The Henrico County Circuit Court entered
summary judgment for Erie, concluding that Newman was not an
insured under the policy provisions because he was not "using,
occupying, getting on or getting off of the school bus at the time of
the accident,' as per Stern v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." 16
6
The supreme court reversed the portion of the judgment that
held that Newman was not "using" the bus within the meaning of
section 38.2-2206.167 In so doing, it overruled its holding in Stern
that "a bus driver used a bus and its equipment to create a safety
160. The new provision reads:
The bringing of an action against an unknown owner or operator as John Doe
shall toll the statute of limitations for purposes of bringing an action against
the owner or operator who caused the injury or damages until his identity be-
comes known. In no event shall an action be brought against an owner or op-
erator who caused the injury or damages, previously filed against as John
Doe, more than three years from the commencement of the action against the
unknown owner or operator as John Doe in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
161. 256 Va. 501, 507 S.E.2d 348 (1998).
162. See supra Part VIA.
163. Newman, 256 Va. at 505, 507 S.E.2d at 350. Virginia Code section 38.2-2206 de-
fines "insured" as, among others, "any person who uses the motor vehicle to which the
policy applies, with the expressed or implied consent of the named insured." VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-2206(B) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cur. Supp. 2000).
164. Newman, 256 Va. at 503, 507 S.E.2d at 349.
165. Id. at 504, 507 S.E.2d at 349.
166. Id. (citing Stern v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 252 Va. 307, 477 S.E.2d 517 (1996)).
167. Id. at 510, 507 S.E.2d at 353.
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zone, for the child but that 'the safety measures did not constitute
a use of the bus by [the child].'"'68 There, the child was not "using"
the bus "because she was not yet a passenger of the school bus'"
when the accident happened. 9
In Newman, the supreme court held that "the relevant inquiry
is whether 'there was a causal relationship between the accident
and the use of the insured vehicle as a vehicle.""'7 This relation-
ship has been found where the insured "was utilizing the [vehi-
cle's] specialized equipment to perform his mission"'7' and where
the vehicle "was an integral part of his mission."'72 Applying
these cases, the supreme court stated that if an "individual, who
has not occupied an insured vehicle, utilizes [its] specialized
safety equipment as an integral part of performing his mission,
with the immediate intent to occupy the vehicle," then he "uses"
the vehicle within the meaning of the UM statute.'7 3
Though Stern recognized that only the bus driver uses the spe-
cialized safety equipment, children also use the equipment as an
integral part of their mission of walking across the street to board
the bus.'7 ' Therefore, the supreme court overruled its holding in
Stern and concluded that Newman was "using" the bus when he
was injured. 75 The supreme court noted that its holding elimi-
nates the paradox created by Stern that only children who are
injured while crossing the street after exiting a school bus are en-
titled to UM/UIM coverage, while those injured in the same loca-
tion while boarding the bus are denied coverage.
7 6
168. Id. at 506, 507 S.E.2d at 350 (alteration in original) (quoting Stern, 252 Va. at 312,
477 S.E.2d at 520).
169. Id. (quoting Stern, 252 Va. at 313, 477 S.E.2d at 520).
170. Id. at 506, 507 S.E.2d at 351 (quoting Edwards v. GEICO, 256 Va. 128, 132, 500
S.E.2d 819, 821 (1998)).
171. Id. at 507, 507 S.E.2d at 351 (citing Randall v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Va. 62,
67, 496 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1998)).
172. Id. (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 424, 389 S.E.2d 476, 477
(1990)).
173. Id. at 508, 507 S.E.2d at 352.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 509, 507 S.E.2d at 352.
176. Id. at 510-11, 507 S.E.2d at 353.
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IX. WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
A. Notice of Accident
Since 1998, the Supreme Court of Virginia and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have decided cases
involving the surrender of rights under insurance policies due to
breaches of the policy provisions by insureds as well as insur-
ers.
177
In Craig v. Dye, 78 the Supreme Court of Virginia construed a
policy provision excluding coverage if an insured "refuses" to per-
form certain duties.7 9 Robert Dye was insured under a State
Farm personal liability umbrella insurance policy issued to his
parents. 8 ° He was in a car accident with Jose Salvadore Antonio,
who died as a result.'' More than two years later, State Farm
first received notice of the accident from Dye's father, who said
that he "never had the slightest idea'" that the policy would cover
his son."2 State Farm denied coverage because the insureds failed
to timely notify it of the accident. 83
The personal representative of Antonio's estate filed a declara-
tory judgment action to determine whether Dye was covered un-
der the policy for the accident."M The circuit court awarded State
Farm summary judgment, concluding that Dye "is not covered
under State Farm's Umbrella Policy and there is no coverage ap-
plicable to [Dye] under the policy in question for failure to provide
timely notice ... "'1"
The supreme court reversed.'86 Although it had held in a previ-
ous case that substantial compliance with a policy's notice provi-
sion is a condition precedent to coverage, 8 7 the supreme court
distinguished between the language in other policies and that in
177. See infra notes 178-91 and accompanying text.
178. 259 Va. 533, 526 S.E.2d 9 (2000).
179. Id. at 534, 526 S.E.2d at 10.
180. Id. at 535, 526 S.E.2d at 10.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 536, 526 S.E.2d at 11.
183. Id. at 535, 526 S.E.2d at 10-11.
184. Id., 526 S.E.2d at 10.
185. Id. at 536, 526 S.E.2d at 11.
186. Id. at 539, 526 S.E.2d at 13.
187. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Scott, 236 Va. 116, 119, 372 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1988).
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State Farm's policy.'88 The latter policy said that the company
may not provide coverage if the insureds "refuse'"-not "fail"-to
provide notice.'89 Looking at the ordinary and accepted meanings
of "refuse" and "fail," the supreme court found that the words
were not synonymous. 9 ' The insureds' failure to give timely no-
tice "was not a refusal to do so" and did not allow State Farm to
deny coverage.'91
B. Notice of Breach of Policy Terms or Conditions
In Morrel v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,192 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed
the issue of waiver of policy defenses by the insurer.193 The Mor-
rels obtained a default judgment against a contractor who dam-
aged their home during its renovation.' Nationwide, the contrac-
tor's liability insurer, refused to satisfy the judgment, claiming
that the contractor breached the policy provisions requiring it to
assist Nationwide in the investigation and lawsuit.'95
In an action against Nationwide to enforce the judgment,'96 the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia awarded
the Morrels summary judgment, finding "that Nationwide had
delayed too long in notifying [them] that it would invoke the con-
tractor's failure to perform under the policy as a defense to liabil-
ity.19
7
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Nationwide waived
its right to rely on the insured's breach of the policy as a de-
188. Craig, 259 Va. at 537, 526 S.E.2d at 12.
189. Id. at 537-38, 526 S.E.2d at 12.
190. Id. at 538-39, 526 S.E.2d at 12.
191. Id. at 539, 526 S.E.2d at 12.
192. 188 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 1999).
193. Id. at 227.
194. Id. at 220-21.
195. Id.
196. Virginia Code section 38.2-2200 provides in part:
That if execution on a judgment against the insured or his personal represen-
tative is returned unsatisfied in an action brought to recover damages for
injury sustained or for loss or damage incurred during the life of the policy or
contract, then an action may be maintained against the insurer under the
terms of the policy or contract for the amount of the judgment not exceeding
the amount of the applicable limit of coverage under the policy or contract.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2200(2) (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
197. Morrel, 188 F.3d at 221.
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fense 98 To protect claimants such as the Morrels, Virginia Code
section 38.2-2226 requires an insurer to notify a claimant
promptly of its intention to defend based on an insured's breach
of the policy.'99 Federal and state courts interpreting this statute
have held that an insurer waives its right to rely on the insured's
breach if it fails to notify a claimant within the twenty-day statu-
tory period. °°
"'[Diiscovery of a breach entails, first, awareness by the insurer
of facts tending to show there has been a violation of the policy
provisions and, second, evaluation of those known facts culmi-
nating in a decision that a breach apparently has occurred.'"2 °'
Since Nationwide had discovered the contractor's breach more
than three months before notifying the Morrels, it did not satisfy
the statutory notification requirement and waived its right to
raise the defense.20 2
The circuit court also noted that the twenty-day period in Vir-
ginia Code section 38.2-2226 is not triggered by an insurer's de-
termination that, "for strategic or tactical reasons, it will defi-
nitely rely on its insured's breach," but rather, by discovery of the
claim and breach of the policy.20 3
198. Id. at 222.
199. Id. at 226. The version of Virginia Code section 38.2-2226 then in effect provided
that:
Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a breach of
the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the insured and the in-
surer intends to rely on the breach in defense of liability for any claim within
the terms of the policy, the insurer shall notify the claimant ... of its inten-
tion to rely on the breach as a defense. Notification shall be given within
twenty days after discovery by the insurer or any of its agents of the breach
or of the claim, whichever is later.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Rep. Vol. 1994). The statute was amended in 1997 and now
reads:
Whenever any insurer on a policy of liability insurance discovers a breach of
the terms or conditions of the insurance contract by the insured, the insurer
shall notify the claimant or the claimant's counsel of the breach. Notification
shall be given within forty-five days after discovery by the insurer of the
breach or of the claim, whichever is later.... Failure to give the notice within
forty-five days will result in a waiver of the defense based on such breach to
the extent of the claim by operation of law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-2226 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2000).
200. Morrel, 188 F.3d at 226 (citations omitted).
201. Id. at 227 (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 223 Va. 317, 326, 288
S.E.2d 469, 474 (1982)).
202. Id. at 228.
203. Id.
